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Abstract – The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary
game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic
imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional imitation. To study the transition between
both regimes, we propose a new evolutionary rule, which stochastically combines unconditional
imitation with another imitative rule. We find that, surprisingly, in many social dilemmas this
rule yields higher cooperative levels than any of the two original ones. This nontrivial effect occurs
because the basic rules induce a separation of timescales in the microscopic processes at cluster
interfaces. The result is robust in the space of 2× 2 symmetric games, on regular lattices and on
scale-free networks.
Copyright c© EPLA, 2009
Why individuals cooperate is a key problem in a wide
range of disciplines [1], being studied theoretically mainly
within the framework of evolutionary game theory [2].
One of the proposed mechanisms to explain cooperation is
network reciprocity [3], and so different population struc-
tures are known to have an influence on the evolutionary
outcome of social dilemmas [4]. All these models incorpo-
rate some kind of evolutionary dynamics [5], whose update
rules may play a crucial role in the results. For exam-
ple, the well-known promotion of cooperation in Prisoner’s
Dilemma enforced by spatial lattices [6] is linked to a
particular non-stochastic rule (unconditional imitation),
and this effect is greatly reduced if another dynamics,
imitative but stochastic, is employed [7,8].
Imitation is a well-known feature of human behav-
ior [9,10]. By an imitative dynamics we understand an
update rule that makes individuals copy, within certain
constraints, the strategy of those other players that are
doing better, or, in game theoretical terms, that are
obtaining higher payoffs from the game. In the case of
network reciprocity, the range of individuals that every
player takes into account is limited to her nearest neigh-
bors on the network. Two of the most frequently used
imitative dynamics in the literature are the unconditional
imitation rule and the replicator rule [4]. In the former,
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individuals acquire the strategy of the player with the
maximum payoff in their neighborhood including them-
selves [6]. In the latter, players choose a neighbor at
random and copy her strategy with probability propor-
tional to the difference of payoffs, provided the neigh-
bor’s payoff is greater than hers. It can be proven [11]
that in large well-mixed populations this last rule induces
an evolutionary dynamics equal to the replicator equa-
tion, thus leading the population to asymptotic states very
closely related to the evolutionary stable equilibria of the
game [5]. In structured populations, though, the evolution-
ary outcome may greatly differ from the equilibria of the
game [4], and different evolutionary dynamics can yield
very different results, as in the example above. Therefore,
it is very relevant to study the dependence of the promo-
tion of cooperation on the evolutionary rules and their
robustness against perturbations.
In this work, we focus on this issue within the framework
of unconditional imitation and spatial lattices. It may be
argued that sometimes individuals can be able to iden-
tify the strategy of all their neighbors and correctly assess
their earnings, but it is difficult to assume that all this
complex process may proceed without errors or distur-
bances. Indeed, previous work has pursued this enquiry,
using a Moran-like rule with weighted probabilities [12],
finding a progressive lowering of the cooperation levels
as the rule differs from unconditional imitation. Here
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we use a different approach, which consists in stochasti-
cally combining unconditional imitation with another less
demanding imitative rule. Thus, when an individual is to
update her strategy, she follows unconditional imitation
with probability 1− ρ and the other rule with probabil-
ity ρ (the other rule is the replicator rule, unless stated
otherwise). The resulting evolutionary rule, which we call
the ρ-rule in the following, is local and imitative, and the
parameter ρ∈ [0, 1] measures the perturbation introduced.
Notice that this setting differs from a mutation scheme,
as the players do not acquire indefinitely, or until the next
mutation, the secondary rule.
We have studied computationally the outcome of the
ρ-rule with 2× 2 symmetric games, which are games with 2
players who choose between 2 strategies, with no difference
in role. We use the following parametrization of the payoff
matrix [7,8,13]:
C D
C
D
(
1 S
T 0
)
,
(1)
where rows represent the strategy (C for cooperate and
D for defect) of the player who obtains the payoff and
columns that of her opponent. Restricting parameters to
the square −1<S < 1, 0<T < 2, we have the Harmony
game [14] (0<S, T < 1) and three classic social dilemmas:
the Prisoner’s Dilemma [15] (−1<S < 0, 1<T < 2), the
Stag Hunt game [16] (−1<S < 0<T < 1), and the Hawk-
Dove [17] or Snowdrift game [18] (0<S < 1<T < 2).
Therefore each game corresponds to a unit square in
the ST -plane. We have considered square lattices with
4- and 8-neighborhoods, doing the update synchronously
(all players play and then they simultaneously update
their strategy) or asynchronously (players play and update
their strategy sequentially in random order).
Figure 1 displays an example of the nontrivial behavior
obtained with the ρ-rule, showing the asymptotic fraction
of cooperators x∗ as a function of the probability ρ, for a
Prisoner’s Dilemma of parameters S =−0.7 and T = 1.1.
With this game, both ρ= 0 (unconditional imitation) and
ρ= 1 (replicator rule) result in full defection, but a large
range of values of ρ yield almost full cooperation. This
phenomenon resembles resonance-like behavior found in
other game-theoretical models [19,20], albeit in this case
the effect is very large and occurs for a wide range of ρ.
The explanation of this counter-intuitive result lies
in the different microscopic dynamical processes, with
greatly differing timescales, that the update rules induce.
Their combination gives rise to a ratchet effect, something
that can yield paradoxical outcomes, as in the famous
Parrondo’s games [21–23]. On regular lattices both rules
enhance cooperation by means of the formation and
growth of clusters of cooperators [6]. With unconditional
imitation clusters grow rapidly and mostly with flat
interfaces, whereas with the replicator rule clusters grow
much more slowly and have much rougher interfaces [7].
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Fig. 1: Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (S =−0.7, T = 1.1), as a function of ρ, with synchro-
nous (filled squares) or asynchronous (empty squares) update.
Population size N = 104 individuals, arranged on a square
lattice with 8 neighbors and periodic boundary conditions.
The initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5, randomly distributed.
Simulation time is 104 generations. The asymptotic values
are obtained as the mean over the last 103 generations, aver-
aged over 100 realizations. Inset: results with population sizes
N = 2500 (triangles down), N = 104 (squares) and N = 4× 104
(triangles up). The results for N = 104 and N = 4× 104 are
virtually identical, and all three are very similar for ρ> 0.2.
Lines are a guide to the eye.
Let us consider a flat interface of opposing cooperators
and defectors in a 8-neighbor lattice, as depicted in
fig. 2(a). With unconditional imitation (ρ= 0) defectors
at the boundary become cooperators if 5+ 3S > 3T .
Otherwise the interface remains frozen, and clusters of
cooperators are not able to grow. With the replicator
rule (ρ= 1), cooperators at the boundary become, with a
certain probability, defectors and the interface roughens
progressively. When ρ> 0 the flat interface slowly becomes
rougher because of those players that happen to follow the
replicator rule, and then nearby defectors that happen to
follow unconditional imitation rapidly become coopera-
tors precisely because of the irregularities at the interface.
For example, starting from the flat interface in fig. 2(a) a
cooperator will use the replicator rule and compare payoff
with one of the opposing defectors with probability 3ρ/8,
becoming with some probability a defector (fig. 2(b)). If
this player follows unconditional imitation in the next
update she will switch back to cooperation. If not, with a
certain probability, one of the nearby defectors becomes
herself a cooperator, using again the replicator rule, thus
producing the kink of fig. 2(c). This configuration is
critical because if nearby defectors follow unconditional
imitation in the next time steps, they will immediately
become cooperators, and the interface will advance one
step to the right (figs. 2(d), (e)). Note the asymmetry that
induces this ratchet effect: unconditional imitation makes
defectors at interface irregularities become cooperators
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Fig. 2: (Colour on-line) Flat interface evolution, with synchronous update, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma of fig. 1 and ρ > 0. Each
position shows the strategy and payoff of a player. Cooperators are depicted in red and defectors in blue. Changes of strategy
made under unconditional imitation are labeled with UI, and those under the replicator rule with REP.
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Fig. 3: (Colour on-line) Asymptotic fraction of cooperators, for different social dilemmas defined by S and T , as ρ varies from
0 to 1. The population is arranged on a square lattice (first row, panels (a) to (e)) or a Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network
(second row, panels (f) to (j)), both of mean degree equal to 8. The update is synchronous. Remaining parameters are as in
fig. 1. Notice the numbers above Harmony and Snowdrift (below Stag Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma) squares, which show the
average asymptotic cooperation achieved in each game square (see text).
but not vice versa, producing an irreversible movement
of the cluster interface. Simulations show this kind of
growth process, where irregularities at interfaces of clus-
ters appear in configurations similar to that of fig. 2 and
also in cluster corners, giving rise to cascades of conver-
sions from defectors to cooperators along the interfaces.
As is typical for dynamics driven by unconditional
imitation [7,8], the population ends up in full cooperation
as long as there are, at initial time, small clusters of
cooperators that resist defector invasion and grow.
Greater population sizes mean larger probabilities of
these clusters to occur, and so there is a dependence on
system size in the region close to ρ= 0 (inset of fig. 1).
Note also that the time of convergence diverges in the
limit ρ→ 0, because the interface instabilities explained
above take place with a probability proportional to ρ2, as
they require two players at the interface to follow (with
probability ρ) the replicator rule.
The fact that this mechanism is rooted in the basic
microscopic processes that the update rules cause is
a hint that it should occur with other games where
these processes are also known to take place [7,8].
Figures 3(a)–(e) illustrate this point, displaying the
asymptotic fraction of cooperators in the same network
topology as fig. 1, for different values of ρ and with the
games introduced above: Harmony (upper left square),
Stag Hunt (lower left), Snowdrift (upper right) and Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (lower right). To have a measure of the
global influence on each kind of game, we have calculated
the average value of the asymptotic fraction of cooperators
achieved in each game square [7,8]. The resulting numbers
are displayed beside the corresponding square (above for
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Harmony and Snowdrift games, below for Stag Hunt and
Prisoner’s Dilemmas). Notice how the transition between
full cooperation and full defection of fig. 3(a) advances
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma square for intermediate values
of ρ. With unconditional imitation (ρ= 0) this boundary
is given by the payoff equality between cooperators and
defectors at both sides of a flat interface [6], which for
the setting of fig. 3(a) corresponds to T −S = 5/3. With
0< ρ≪ 1 (figs. 3(b), (c)), this boundary is instead given
by 2T −S = 3, which is precisely the condition for the
payoff equality of the players who determine the start
of cascades at the interfaces, namely the players on the
third row, second and third columns, of fig. 2(c). Note
also that the transition line at T = 8/5, which determines
the instability of inwards corners of cooperators [6,24],
is preserved for ρ > 0, and that a new line appears at
T = 4/3, which gives the condition for which the irregu-
larities of cluster interfaces, caused by the replicator rule,
trigger a defector invasion under unconditional imitation
(compare the payoff of the defector on the fifth row and
second column of fig. 2(c) with that of the cooperator two
positions to the left).
Considering other stochastic imitative rules to be used
in the ρ-rule, like the multiple replicator or the Moran
rules [4,7], does not significantly change the results. In fact,
any imitative local rule that destabilizes the interfaces
of clusters of cooperators and that works on a slower
timescale than unconditional imitation (as it is expected
for stochastic rules) will produce qualitatively similar
results. We have found this phenomenon even with a
random local rule (players just adopt the strategy of one
randomly chosen neighbor), providing that ρ≪ 1. The
effect is also robust against changes in the degree of the
network and is found with synchronous and asynchronous
update.
Another important variation to consider in this model
is that of the topology of the underlying network. Apart
from the clustering of spatial lattices [6], the degree
heterogeneity of scale-free networks is another topological
property known to have an important impact on the
evolution of cooperation [8,13]. In consequence, we have
also studied the evolutionary outcome that the ρ-rule
yields on populations structured according to Baraba´si-
Albert scale-free networks [25]. The results are presented
in figs. 3(f)–(j).
From the point of view of the evolution of cooperation
fig. 3 shows that, for a large range of ρ, practically full
cooperation is obtained in Stag Hunt (Snowdrift) games on
spatial (scale-free) networks. Very importantly, with the
ρ-rule the population achieves full cooperation precisely
in those games where the underlying population struc-
ture has its greatest impact [8]. Regarding the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, we have studied the average asymptotic coop-
eration 〈x∗〉PD in the corresponding game square, obtain-
ing the results shown in fig. 4, both for spatial lattices (a)
and scale-free networks (b). Interestingly, some differences
appear depending on the synchronicity of the update.
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Fig. 4: Average asymptotic cooperation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma 〈x∗〉PD, as a function of ρ. Populations are distributed
on square lattices (a) or scale-free networks (b), both of
mean degree = 8. The update is synchronous (filled squares)
or asynchronous (empty squares). Remaining parameters are
as in fig. 1. Notice the different scales of 〈x∗〉PD in (a) and (b).
With synchronous update, a maximum average cooper-
ation is achieved for an optimum ρ, whereas for asynchro-
nous update the result is rather a plateau over a large
range of ρ. On spatial lattices the differences are small, but
on scale-free networks they are strikingly large, specially
for ρ≪ 1. We have shown elsewhere [7] that, with spatial
lattices, unconditional imitation is a rule which yields
different results for some specific games depending on the
synchronicity of the update, but to our knowledge this
large sensitivity in the case of scale-free networks has not
been reported in the literature and so it deserves further
investigation.
In conclusion, we have introduced an evolutionary rule
that allows to relax the demanding requirements of the
unconditional imitation rule, while maintaining the basic
properties of imitative behavior and local information. We
have found that, for a wide range of ρ, the cooperation
levels that it yields are not only preserved but in many
cases they are even enhanced. This conclusion is general
and independent of the details of the model; hence the
reported mechanism might have an impact on many
other evolutionary games. This work thus offers a new
perspective on the significance of imitative dynamics,
in general, and unconditional imitation, in particular.
Instead of considering the promotion of cooperation
ascribed to this rule as a singularity, we can now see it as
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a more robust outcome. Our results suggest that rather
than the lack of stochasticity of unconditional imitation,
it is the fast time scale what constitutes its key feature.
Note that the evolution with unconditional imitation
under asynchronous update is equivalent to some extent
of stochastic perturbation to the synchronous case, and
nonetheless the outcome is similar for most games on
degree-homogeneous networks [7].
Finally, and from a more general viewpoint, this result
belongs to a wider class of paradoxical behaviors origi-
nated in ratchet effects resulting from the combination of
two dynamics, Parrondo’s paradox being the best known
example [21–23].
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